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PHYSICIAN IMMUNITY UNDER THE
MASSACHUSETTS TORT CLAIMS ACT:
A TEST WITHOUT DIRECTION
TERRISKLADANY*
INTRODUCTION

The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA) provides immunity
to physicians working as "public employees" by transferring liability
for their negligent or wrongful acts to the employer.l Many physi
cians work exclusively as either "public employees" or private practi
tioners and, therefore, clearly are included within or excluded from
the MTCA grant of personal immunity. Some physicians, however,
fall within a "gray area," exhibiting characteristics of both public and
private practitioner. In Kelley v. Rossi 2 and Smith v. Steinberg,3 the
• B.A., Albright College, 1972; M.S., University of Arizona, 1973; J.D., Western
New England College School of Law, 1986. Ms. Skladany has been an associate at Greene,
Bloom & Terk in Hartford, Connecticut, and currently anticipates practicing Native Amer
ican law in Arizona.
I. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258, § 2 (1986) ("Public employers shall be liable for injury or
loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any public employee while acting within the scope of his office or employment

.... ").
2. 395 Mass. 659,481 N.E.2d 1340 (1985). In Kelley, the parents of a deceased boy
brought a negligence action against Dr. Rossi and Boston City Hospital after the physician
failed to diagnose the boy's fatal condition. At the time of the alleged malpractice, Dr.
Rossi was participating in Boston University School of Medicine's residency program. The
program included a rotating work schedule whereby the residents would serve in a number
of area hospitals according to a schedule that Boston City Hospital established. On the
night of the alleged malpractice, Dr. Rossi was working at Kennedy Memorial Hospital (a
private institution). [d. at 660, 481 N.E.2d at 1341. Doctor Rossi claimed immunity under
the MTCA. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed a superior court order
granting summary judgment in favor of the physician, stating that there was a question of
material fact as to whether the physician was a "public employee" at the time of the alleged
negligence. Thus, there was a question as to the applicability of the MTCA. [d. at 665, 481
N.E.2d at 1344. See infra text and notes beginning at note 30 for an extended discussion of
Kelley.
3. 395 Mass. 666, 481 N.E.2d 1344 (1985). In this case, Dr. Steinberg was an associ
ate professor of orthopedic surgery and a member of a group practice plan that is available
to instructors at the University of Massachusetts Medical School. Physicians who work in
the group practice plan are paid by the plan for their services, but set their own hours and
choose their own patients. At the time of the alleged malpractice, Dr. Steinberg was work
ing for the group practice plan. [d. at 667, 669, 481 N.E.2d at 1345-47. The supreme
5
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts defined the scope of the
MTCA with respect to these physicians by applying a common law
direction and control test to distinguish between "public employee"
physicians and private practitioners, and, thus, to determine the avail
ability of personal immunity for the physicians.
This article provides an overview of the law regarding govern
ment liability in Massachusetts prior to 1978, and discusses the short
comings of that system of rules which prompted the enactment of the
MTCA. The analysis then focuses on the current process for deter
mining the applicability of MTCA immunity to "gray area" physi
cians; specifically, an analysis of the direction and control test's
efficacy in determining physician liability. The article critically exam
ines the supreme judicial court's current interpretation of the MTCA
and suggests that the policies that were to be promoted by the Act are
not well-served with respect to personal immunity for "gray area"
physicians.
An alternative to the direction and control test, based on the con
cerns and policies that underlie the MTCA, would be to deny personal
immunity to all physicians who do not work exclusively for a govern
mental entity. This article supports such an alternative scheme and
offers methods for its implementation.
I.

IMMUNITY UNDER THE MASSACHUSETTS TORT CLAIMS ACT

The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act immunizes "public employ
ees" from personal liability for injuries that they cause while working
within the scope of government employment. 4 In turn, the govern
ment employer assumes liability for judgments on claims asserted
against its employees up to a maximum recovery of $100,000.00 per
plaintiff. 5 This remedy against the government is exclusive. 6 Conse
judicial court affirmed an order denying Dr. Steinberg's motion for summary judgment
because there was a question of material fact as to whether the physician was a "public
employee" and, therefore, whether the physician was within the protection of the MTCA.
Id. at 669, 481 N.E.2d at 1347. See infra text and notes beginning at note 49 for an ex
tended discussion of Steinberg.
.
4. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258, § 2 (1986). See supra note 1 for partial text of the Act.
5. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258, § 2 (1986). In Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745,467
N.E.2d 1292 (1984), the supreme judicial court interpreted § 2 of the Massachusetts Tort
Claims Act to limit the liability of the municipality to $100,000.00 per plaintiff. Id. at 766,
467 N.E.2d at 1306. In Irwin, one plaintiff asserted two claims against the municipality for
her own personal injuries and for loss of consortium caused by the death of her husband.
However, the supreme judicial court adopted a rule whereby each plaintiff can recover a
maximum of $100,000.00, regardless of how many claims that plaintiff asserts. Id. at 766
73,467 N.E.2d at 1306-11.
6. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258, § 2 (1986) ("The remedies provided by this chapter shall
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quently, a plaintiff who has a claim against a "public employee" physi
cian cannot obtain a judgment against the negligent physician, but
may sue the "public employer" and recover a maximum judgment of
$100,000.00.
The threshold inquiry in the physician malpractice litigation pro
cess, then, is to establish whether at the time of the alleged malprac
tice, the physician was a "public employee." This often is a difficult
question because the legislature did not define the term "public em
ployee" clearly in the statute. "Public employees" are defined as
"elected or appointed, officers or employees of any public employer,
whether serving full or part-time, temporary or permanent, compen
sated or uncompensated, and officers or soldiers of the military forces
of the commonwealth."7 Although this provision sets forth some
qualifications for status as a "public employee," these qualifications
are so broad that almost any person who performs services that are in
some way connected to the commonwealth could be considered a
"public employee."
The definition's ambiguity is compounded by the inclusion of the
term "public employer." Although the term "public employer" is de
fined in section one of the Act, it is a very broad definition, covering
almost all government institutions. 8 Additionally, the Act circularly
refers to "public employee" in the definition of "public employer"
where it states that a "public employer" is any "agency or authority
... [that] exercises direction and control over the public employee."9
Because of this ambiguous statutory language and an insufficient legis
lative history, 10 the supreme judicial court, as interpreter of the Act,
be exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter
against the public employer or, the public employee ....").
7. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258, § I (1986).
8. The definition of "public employer" in the MTCA includes, among other things,
"the commonwealth and any county, city, town, educational colIaborative, or district, in
cluding any public health district ... and any department, office, commission, committee,
council, board, division, bureau, institution, agency or authority thereof which exercises
direction and control over the public employee ...." MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258, § I (1986).
9. !d. Under the direction and control test there is ,me final requirement for immu
nity to be applicable. That is, the tort had to occur while the employee was working within
the scope of government employment. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258, § 2 (1986). See Pruner v.
Clerk of the Superior Court, 382 Mass. 309, 315,415 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1981). Even if the
individual indisputably was a "public employee," if that person was negligent in the per
formance of duties that are outside of the government operation then he or she cannot use
immunity under the MTCA as a defense.
10. No legislative history about the purposes of the MTCA is recorded. Telephone
interview with Christina Coolidge, Reference Librarian at the Library of the State House in
Boston, Massachusetts (October II, 1985). Therefore, this article, and for that matter the
courts, cannot declare legislative intent definitively. Nevertheless, the supreme judicial
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has had little guidance in resolving the issue of which employees are
protected under the MTCA as "public employees."!!
A.

The Call for Reform

Before critically analyzing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court's approach to physician immunity under the MTCA, the his
tory of governmental immunity in Massachusetts must be explored in
order to appreciate the policies behind the Act. The original common
law principle espoused by the supreme judicial court provided that the
commonwealth was immune from all liability unless the legislature or
dered otherwise.!2 The supreme judicial court modified this principle
in Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth,13 where the court expressly
court has articulated its understanding of what the legislature intended to achieve through
the Act by referring to case law preceding the Act's passage. See, e.g., Pina v. Common
wealth, 400 Mass. 408, 412-13, 510 N.E.2d 253,256 (1987) (referring to Whitney v. City of
Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977». Thus, in considering the driving
forces behind the Act, this article will focus on the supreme judicial court's articulation of
the legislative intent.
II. The court in Kelley v. Rossi, 395 Mass. 659,481 N.E.2d 1340 (1985), stated that
the definition of "public employee" in § 1 of the Act "provides no detailed guidance in
deciding whether a person is a 'public employee.' " Id. at 661, 481 N.E.2d at 1342 (1985).
The difficulty in giving meaning to the definitions in the MTCA posed by the absence
of legislative history is reflected in Recent Development, Sovereign Immunity in Massachu
setts, 13 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877 (1978): "[T]he bill's language does not adequately define
the scope of governmental liability and judicial interpretation will, of necessity, be guided
by prior case law, especially the Whitney decision." Id. at 878 (referring to Whitney v. City
of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977».
The court's role in these cases is similar to its role in Glasser v. Director of Div. of
Employment Sec., 393 Mass. 574, 471 N.E.2d 1338 (1984). There, the supreme judicial
court interpreted a provision in the unemployment compensation statute. MASS. GEN. L.
ch. ISlA, § 25(e)(3) (1986). The court stated that it is within its province to interpret
statutes "according to the intent of the Legislature, as evidenced by the language used, and
considering the purposes and remedies intended to be advanced." Glasser, 393 Mass. at
577, 471 N.E.2d at 1340. Because statutes are often written in ambiguous terms, the
supreme judicial court must construe these ambiguities in order to determine the statute's
applicability. See also Tedford v. Mass. Housing Fin. Agency, 390 Mass. 688, 696, 459
N.E.2d 780, 785 (1984) (quoting School Comm. v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, 385 Mass. 70,
79-80,431 N.E.2d 180, 186-87 (1982), and citing Massachusetts Turnpike Auth. v. Com
monwealth, 347 Mass. 524, 528, 199 N.E.2d 175, 178 (1964» (" 'Where the draftsmanship
of a statute is faulty or lacks precision, it is our duty to give the statute a reasonable con
struction.' ... We interpret the statute to best effectuate the legislative intent, viewing the
statute as a whole.").
12. See Troy & G.R.R. v. Commonwealth, 127 Mass. 43 (1879). In Troy, the
supreme judicial court stated that it lacked jurisdiction over a mortgagor's bill of redemp
tion against the commonwealth as mortgagee, because the state could be sued only if the
legislature had given its consent. The court characterized immunity as a "fundamental
principle of our jurisprudence." Id. at 46.
13. 363 Mass. 612, 296 N.E.2d 461 (1973). In this case, Morash & Sons, Inc.
claimed that its water supply was polluted by road salt that the commonwealth stored on
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rejected the reasoning that immunity had to be abrogated by the legis
latureand stated that because sovereign immunity was created judi
cially, it could be abrogated judicially.l4 In fact, by its holding, the
Morash court created an exception to the immunity doctrine for cir
cumstances in which the government maintains a private nuisance. In
addition to the judicial exceptions, the legislature abrogated immunity
in a number of circumstances. IS Because of both legislative and judi
cial exceptions to the common law rule, the system of governmental
immunity became a "convoluted scheme of rules and exception~"16
which were applied haphazardly in a case-by-case manner.17
Prior to the MTCA's enactment, the analytical scheme used to
determine governmental liability began with a comparison of the facts
of each case with the legislatively or judicially enumerated exceptions
to the presumption of immunity. 18 If the case fit into one of these
random exceptions, the action against the government proceeded. If
not subject to one of these exceptions, the case continued through a
two-step common law analysis. In the first step of this procedure, the
court characterized the individual claiming immunity as either a pub
lic officer or municipal agent. 19 If the person accused of negligence
was classified as a public officer, the inquiry terminated in favor of
property adjacent to the corporation's property. Id. at 613, 296 N.E.2d at 462. The corpo
ration brought a suit based on a theory of nuisance and sought an injunction against the
. commonwealth's use of its property and damages. Id. at 614,296 N.E.2d at 642. The trial
court dismissed the action, stating that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the
claim, id. at 613, 296 N.E.2d at 642, but the supreme judicial court reversed that decision.
Id. at 624, 296 N.E.2d at 468.
14. Id. at 615, 296 N.E.2d at 463. For more discussion of the foundations and evolu
tion of governmental immunity in Massachusetts see Note, Governmental Tort Immunity in
Massachusetts: The Present Need for Change and Prospects for the Future, 10 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 521 (1976).
15. The court in Morash cited a number of instances where the legislature abrogated
immunity. "[R]ecovery is permitted against a municipality for damages caused by riots
(G.L. c. 269, § 8), by unlawful exclusion from public schools (G.L. c. 76, § 16), and by
defects in the highways (G.L. c. 84, § IS; G.L. c. 229, § I)." Morash, 363 Mass. at 620, 296
N.E.2d at 466.
16. Whitney v. City of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 209, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1211
(1977).
17. In Morash, the court stated that the immunity scheme was "logically indefen
sible." Morash, 363 Mass. at 618, 296 N.E.2d at 466. It further emphasized that the ability
of a plaintiff to recover for injuries often rested solely on the fortuity of the circumstances,
and that the exceptions to governmental immunity had "no necessary relationship to ac
cepted tort principles, equitable principles, or principles of sound public policy." !d. at
621, 296 N.E.2d at 467.
18. Id. at 620-22, 296 N.E.2d at 466-67.
19. A public officer is an individual who performs public duties that are delegated by
the Massachusetts Legislature. Molinari v. City of Boston, 333 Mass. 394, 395-96, 130
N.E.2d 925,926-27 (1955) (school committee members were public officers because of leg
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governmental immunity because, in theory, there was no local control
over the officer, and thus the government could not be held liable by
way of respondeat superior. 20 If the accused was classified as a munic
ipal agent, the analysis proceeded to a second phase, where the court
identified the activity of the municipality at the time of the alleged
negligence as either a commercial or a public function. 21 If the agent
was performing a public function, there was no government liability.22
However, the government was liable for the negligent performance of
a commercial function by a municipal agent because there was local
control over the agent's actions and the doctrine of respondeat supe
rior applied. 23
islatively mandated duty to provide and maintain properly furnished schoolhouses); see
also Warburton v. City of Quincy, 309 Mass. 111, 114, 34 N.E.2d 661, 663 (1941).
A municipal agent is an individual who performs duties that are not specifically dele
gated or authorized by the legislature. See Whitney, 373 Mass. at 213, 366 N.E.2d at 1213
14. See also Russell v. Town of Canton, 361 Mass. 727, 730, 282 N.E.2d 420, 422 (1972)
(town selectmen acting in eminent domain action were not municipal agents because emi
nent domain is controlled by statute); Commonwealth v. Oliver, 342 Mass. 82, 84, 172
N.E.2d 241, 242 (1961) (plant manager at municipal light company was not a municipal
agent because department of public utilities controlled his action).
20. See Whitney v. City of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 214, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1214
(1977); Molinari v. City of Boston, 333 Mass. 394, 395-96, 130 N.E.2d 925, 926-27 (1955);
Reitano v. City of Haverhill, 309 Mass. 118, 122,34 N.E.2d 665, 667 (1941).
Although the government was not liable for the negligence of a public officer, the
determination of personal liability of the officer included another level of analysis-a mis
feasance/nonfeasance distinction. The court declared that a public officer performing a
public function was liable personally for acts of misfeasance but not for acts of nonfeasance
in the performance of ministerial tasks. Fulgoni v. Johnston, 302 Mass. 421, 423, 19
N.E.2d 542, 543 (1939). In Whitney, the court stated, .. '[N]onfeasance is the omission of
an act which a person ought to do, misfeasance is the improper doing of an act which a
person might lawfully do.''' Whitney, 373 Mass. at 220, 366 N.E.2d at 1217 (quoting
Trum v. Town of Paxton, 329 Mass. 434, 438, 109 N.E.2d 116, 119 (1952». See also
O'Neill v. Mencher, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 610,488 N.E.2d 1187 (1986).
21. In Bolster v. City of Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, 114 N.E. 722 (1917), the supreme
judicial court defined a public function as municipal activity undertaken for the common
public good without the necessity of commercial profit. !d. at 389, 114 N.E. at 724. An
example of a public function is fire protection, both in the maintenance of fire engines and
the employment of firefighting personnel. Fisher v. City of Boston, 104 Mass. 87 (1870).
The supreme judicial court defined a commercial function as conduct undertaken vol
untarily and for profit. Bolster, 225 Mass. at 390, 114 N.E. at 723. For example, maintain
ing a system for distributing and selling water is a commercial function. Iver Johnson
Sporting Goods Co. v. City of Boston, 334 Mass. 401, 135 N.E.2d 658 (1956).
22. Whitney, 373 Mass. at 214,366 N.E.2d at 1214 (citing Bolster, 225 Mass. at 390,
114 N.E. at 724).
23. See id. at 214, 366 N.E.2d at 1214-15. Courts that employed this common law
test did not follow this two-step process invariably. For some courts, the sole determinative
question for the applicability of governmental immunity was whether the conduct could be
considered a public function. See, e.g., Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass.
612,621, 296 N.E.2d 461, 466 (1973).
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This adjudicative process was unsatisfactory; it relied on rules,
classifications, and exceptions that lacked justifiable purposes, and re
sulted in unfairness to both injured plaintiffs and defendants. The
supreme judicial court has since noted that many plaintiffs were pre
cluded from recovering for their injuries, and defendants were found
personally liable, simply because of a capricious distinction in classifi
cation that had no association with sound reasoning or public policy.24
The supreme judicial court's emphatic recognition of the unfair
ness under the common law system of governmental immunity in
duced the legislature to enact the MTCA. In Whitney v. City of
Worcester,2s the supreme judicial court took a stand against the "cop.
voluted scheme of rules and exceptions" surrounding governmental
immunity that had become "unjust and indefensible as a matter of
logic and sound public policy."26 The court stated that it would abro
gate governmental immunity if the legislature did not take action on
the issue by the close of the 1978 session.27
In rejecting the common law approach to governmental immu
nity, the supreme judicial court made it clear that determination of
liability based on superficial employment characteristics was unsatis
factory. The court asserted that a scheme for determining immunity
should be formulated with regard to the reasons why a government
should not be held liable, and with attention to fairness to the par
ties. 28 These admonitions to the legislature are key to interpreting the
legislature's response-the MTCA.29 This article now examines the
24. In Whitney, the supreme judicial court provided an illustration of this unfairness
by comparing a person who was injured by a water department employee and, therefore,
able to recover, with another person who was injured by a fire department employee, and
thus, not able to recover. From the public perspective, because both plaintiffs were injured
by the same defendant-the government-the distinction was trivial. Whitney, 373 Mass.
at 215 n.9, 366 N.E.2d at 1215 n.9 (citations omitted).
25. 373 Mass. 208, 366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977). In this case, a first grade student and
his father brought a negligence action against the city, school committee, superintendent of
schools, principal, assistant principal, teacher, and custodian. The student, who was blind
in one eye with limited vision in the other, was instructed to go to the playground, which
entailed passing through a defective door. The student was struck on the head by the door
and injured severely. After the injury, the assistant principal and the student's teacher told
the student to remain in the classroom, denying him immediate medical care. Because of
the delay in treatment the boy became totally blind. Id. at 221-22,366 N.E.2d at 1218.
26. /d. at 209, 366 N.E.2d at 121\'
27. Id. at 210, 366 N.E.2d at 1212.
28. Id. at 216-17, 366 N.E.2d at 1215-16.
29. Because there is no satisfactory legislative history, see supra note 10. these admo
nitions by the Whitney court are used extensively as evidence of legislative intent. See, e.g.,
Recent Development, supra note II, at 878 ("Since the bill was drafted and amended to
comply strictly with the Whitney decision, the guidelines enunciated.[in Whitney] are ele
vated to a fertile source of legislative intent. ").
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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation of physician
immunity under the MTCA.
B.

The Current Approach

The supreme judicial court recently addressed the "public em
ployee" provision of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act in two cases
where it decided whether physicians qualified for immunity under the
Act. The first case, Kelley v. Rossi,30 involved a physician in a resi
dency program at Boston City Hospital, a public institution. As a
condition of her residency, Boston City Hospital required Dr. Rossi to
participate in a residency rotation program that included service at the
Joseph P. Kennedy Memorial Hospital [hereinafter Kennedy], a pri
vate institution. 3 ! On March 22, 1982, while on rotation at Kennedy,
Dr. Rossi examined eight-year-old Duane Kelley, who complained of
fatigue, vomiting, nausea, abdominal pain, fever and frequency of uri
nation. 32 Doctor Rossi ordered laboratory tests but before the results
were available she diagnosed Duane as having the flu and sent the
Kelleys home with instructions to give Duane popsicles and soda. 33
Doctor Rossi did not read the laboratory findings which indicated that
Duane suffered from a life-threatening form of diabetes. 34 The next
day, Duane lost consciousness and was rushed to another hospital for
treatment where he died eight days later. 35
The Kelleys sued Dr. Rossi for malpractice and the physician de
fended herself by claiming immunity under the MTCA as a "public
employee."36 The trial court granted Dr. Rossi's motion for summary
judgment but the supreme judicial court reversed because there was a
question of material fact as to whether Dr. Rossi was a "public em
ployee" at the time of the alleged malpracticeY
The court began its analysis by declaring that its determination of
whether Dr. Rossi was a "public employee" would be guided by the
same principles that establish a principal's liability for the negligent
acts of its agent under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 38 After
noting that the MTCA definition of "public employee" was not effec
30. 395 Mass. 659,481 N.E.2d 1340 (1985).
31. Id. at 660, 481 N.E.2d at 1341.
32. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 2-3, Kelley v. Rossi, 395 Mass. 659, 481 N.E.2d
1340 (1985) (No. 3731).
33. Id. at 3.
34. Id. at 4.
35. Id. at 4-5.
36. Kelley, 395 Mass. at 660, 481 N.E.2d at 1341.
37. Id. at 665, 481 N.E.2d at 1344.
38. Id. at 661, 481 N.E.2d at 1342.
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tive .for determining one's status as a "public employee" under the
Act, the court turned to the MTCA definition of "public employer"
for guidance. 39 A "public employer" is defined as an employer that
"exercises direction and control over the public employee."40 It is the
direction and control test that the court found to be the common ele
ment between the doctrine of respondeat superior and the determina
tion of one's status as a "public employee."41
Following a brief discussion of the highly skilled and discretion
ary nature of the physician's profession,42 the court summarily stated
that there was little question but that Dr. Rossi was a servant in her
capacity as a resident physician. 43 The critical question for the court
was whether she was a servant of the city or of Kennedy Hospital.
The court concluded that the facts of the case did not support
indisputably the trial court's finding that Dr. Rossi was a servant of
the city, and thus entitled to immunity as a "public employee."44
Depositions of Dr. Rossi and Kennedy's director of medical affairs
indicated that Dr. Rossi was required to follow Kennedy's policies and
procedures, work the hours that Kennedy set, and treat the patients
that Kennedy assigned her.45 Additionally, Dr. Rossi could neither
admit nor discharge patients at Kennedy and was subject to removal
by the hospital. 46
Based on these factors, the supreme judicial court concluded that
there was a question of material fact as to whether Dr. Rossi was a
servant of Boston City Hospital and, therefore, whether she could be
classified as a "public employee" under the MTCA.47 Thus, the court
reversed the summary judgment order in favor of the physician. 48
In Smith v. Steinberg,49 the second case in which the supreme
judicial court reviewed the issue of a physician's immunity under the
MTCA, Dr. Steinberg was a professor of orthopedic surgery at the
University of Massachusetts Medical School. 50 Doctor Steinberg's ed
ucational affiliation with the university automatically conferred upon
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258, § 1 (1986).
Kelley, 395 Mass. at 661, 481 N.E.2d at 1342.
Id. at 662-63, 481 N.E.2d at 1343.
Id.
Id. at 665, 481 N.E.2d at 1344.
Id.
!d.
!d.
Id. at 665, 481 N .E.2d at 1344.
395 Mass. 666,481 N.E.2d 1344 (1985) (decided the same day as Kelley).
Id. at 667, 481 N.E.2d at 1346.
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him membership in the group practice plan at the medical school. 51
The group practice plan provided the opportunity for all faculty at the
medical school to participate in a clinical practice on a fee-for-service
basis, whereby each physician was paid a percentage of the fees col
lected by his or her department. The physicians in the plan set their
own hours and chose their own patients. 52
Doctor Steinberg treated Mrs. Dorothea Smith on referral from
Mrs. Smith's personal physician for the removal of a ganglion on her
right thumb. 53 Prior to successful surgical removal of the ganglion,
Dr. Steinberg ordered routine tests and a chest X-ray. 54 On the pre
operative X-ray, the radiologist noticed a chest growth which he sus
pected was malignant and recommended further evaluation. Never
theless, Dr. Steinberg did not review the radiologist's report until a
year later when Mrs. Smith returned to her personal physician because
she was coughing up blood. 55 Mrs. Smith died from lung and lym
phatic cancer the following year. 56
The Smith family sued Dr. Steinberg for malpractice. Doctor
Steinberg moved for summary judgment claiming immunity under the
MTCA as a "public employee" at the University of Massachusetts
Medical School. 57 The superior court denied his motion and the
supreme judicial court affirmed. 58
On appeal, Dr. Steinberg argued that the statute which created
the group practice plan designated him an employee of the common
wealth, and, thus, he was immune from liability as a "public em
ployee" under the MTCA. 59 The court rejected this argument, stating
that the use of the term "employee" in the statute regarding the Uni
versity of Massachusetts did not control the definition of "public em
51. Id. The group practice plan was established under ST. 1974. ch. 733, § 2.
52. Steinberg, 395 Mass. at 669, 481 N.E.2d at 1347.
53. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 4, Smith v. Steinberg, 395 Mass. 666, 481 N.E.2d
1344 (1985) (No. 3789).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 5.
57. Steinberg, 395 Mass. at 667, 481 N.E.2d at 1345.
58. !d.
59. Steinberg, 395 Mass. at 668, 481 N.E.2d at 1346. The statute upon which Dr.
Steinberg relied states, in part:
All officers and employees, professional and non-professional, of the univer
sity shall continue to be employees of the commonwealth irrespective of the
source of funds from which their salaries or wages are paid. They shall have the
same privileges and benefits of other employees of the commonwealth such as
retirement benefits, group insurance, industrial accident coverage, and other cov
erage enjoyed by all employees of the commonwealth.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 75, § 14 (1986).
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ployee" in the MTCA.60
The court shifted its focus to the commonwealth's direction and
control over Dr. Steinberg, pursuant to the standard that it set forth in
Kelley. 6I It found that the group practice plan's only function with
respect to its members was that of billing patients. 62 Doctor Steinberg
set the hours that he worked, chose his own patients, and generally
"practice[d] medicine as he wished, subject to his teaching obligations
...."63 Thus, the court concluded that Dr. Steinberg was not subject
to the direction and control of the commonwealth and, therefore,
could not avail himself of immunity under the MTCA at the summary
judgment stage. 64
The supreme judicial court's resolution of Dr. Rossi's and Dr.
Steinberg's immunity claims centered on the language of the MTCA
supplemented by the common law direction and control test. The fol
lowing discussion more closely examines the MTCA and this common
law test.
C.

The Issue of Direction and Control

The crux of the analysis in determining the applicability of per
sonal immunity for physicians under the MTCA is the definition of
"public employee." Although the Kelley court suggested that this
term could be given meaning by utilizing the statutory definition of
"public employer," that analysis is nonfunctional without further re
finement. 6s To claim that one is a "public employee" because he or
60.
61.
62.
63.

Steinberg, 395 Mass. at 668-69, 481 N.E.2d at 1346.
Id. at 669, 481 N.E.2d at 1346-47.
!d. at 669, 481 N.E.2d at 1347.
Id.
64. !d.
65. The classification of employment relationships between hospitals and physicians
is particularly difficult because specialization in the health care industry makes these rela
tionships increasingly complex. See A. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND
HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 347, 378-81 (1978) (discussing hospital liability based on
employment relationships with negligent doctors); see generally PHYSICIAN-HosPITAL RE
LATIONSHIPS (Mass. Continuing L. Educ. 1985) (discussing various aspects of physician
hospital relationships in Massachusetts); see also M. SHAPIRO, GETTING DOCTORED 139
(1978) ("The parallel rise of superspecializationand supertechnology is a striking element
in recent medical history ....").
In Massachusetts, this complexity and the impracticability of classifying employment
relationships is illustrated in a letter from Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti to Alfred
E. Franchette, M.D., Commissioner of Public Health, where the Attorney General sug
gested that physicians employed in a consultant capacity with the commonwealth maintain
their own private malpractice insurance because they may not be within the scope of the
MTCA's immunity. 1979-80 Op. Att'y Gen. of Mass. 106, \06 (December 3, 1979). The
Attorney General claimed that because of the specialized nature of the relationships be
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she is subject to the direction and control of a "public employer" begs
the· further question of what qualifies as direction and contro1. 66
Therefore, in order to give meaning to the direction and control stan
dard, the supreme judicial court referred to the common law regarding
employment relationships and the theory of respondeat superior. 67
The court in Kelley stated that the principles that establish one as
a "public employee" are the same as those which establish liability for
the employer under the theory of respondeat superior.68 However, the
court did not explain the nexus between these doctrines.
The common law doctrine of respondeat superior is grounded in
the policy that a servant's negligence should be imputable to the
master because the servant acts under the master's direction. 69 Inher
ent in this doctrine are the premises that the master is in a better posi
tion than the servant to compensate those persons injured by the
servant, and that the master is best able to prevent negligent conduct
by exercising control over the servant. 70 Thus, the examination of the
master's control over: or the right to control a servant has become the
preferred test for principal liability under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. 7 I
The courts in Massachusetts have used the direction and control
test extensively for determinations of liability under respondeat supe
rior.72 Together with the direction and control test, the Kelley court
tween the commonwealth and consultant physicians, it was not possible to categorize rig
idly the status of the physicians. Id.
66. See supra note 8 for the statutory definition of public employer.
67. Kelley v. Rossi, 395 Mass. 661,481 N.E.2d 1340, 1342 (1985).
68. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
69. See Khoury v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 265 Mass. 236, 238, 164 N.E. 77,
78 (1928). Although scholars are uncertain as to the origin of respondeat superior, Oliver
Wendell Holmes proffered an interesting theory based in Roman law in which the leader of
. a household was liable for negligent acts of family members. See generally Holmes, Agency,
4 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1891).
70. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.1, at 1363-64 (1956). See
also G. WILLIAMS & B. HEPPLE, FOUNDATIONS OF TORT 113 (1976) (A principal reason
for vicarious liability is "the desire of the judges to give the victim an effective remedy when
he is injured by a person who is likely to have small means. ").
71. "The commonest test of a relationship to which the law attaches vicarious liabil
ity is control or the general right of control. ... [T]his right of control has been used not
only as a test or description but also as ajustification for imposing vicarious liability where
control exists." James, Vicarious Liability, 28 TuL. L. REV. 161, 165 (1954). See also
Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984).
The terms respondeat superior and vicarious liability are often used interchangeably.
See, e.g., id. at 1260; Fitzpatrick & Carman, Respondeat Superior and the Federal Securities
Laws: A Round Peg and a Square Hole, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1,27 (1983).
72. See, e.g., Chicopee Lions Club v. District Attorney, 396 Mass. 244, 485 N.E.2d
673 (1985) (Hampden County and commonwealth did not exercise direction and control
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utilized the Restatement (Second) of Agency to refine further what
constitutes direction and control under the MTCA.73 From its inter
pretation of the common law principles of respondeat superior and
from the guidance of the Restatement, the supreme judicial court ar
ticulated three factors for determining a hospital's control over a phy
SICian: 1) scheduling of work hours, 2) selection of patients, and
3) establishment of policies and procedures. 74 Under the direction and
over district attorney so they could not be held liable under respondeat superior); Konick v.
Berke, Moore Co., 355 Mass. 463, 245 N.E.2d 750 (1969) (direction and control test used
to determine liability of employer under respondeat superior when employee, while per
forming an errand for the company in his own car, was involved in an accident); Marino v.
Trawler Emil C, Inc., 350 Mass. 88, 213 N.E.2d 238 (1966) (direction and control test used
to determine liability under respondeat superior between pilots of planes that crashed and
fishing boat owners who hired pilots to spot fish).
The direction and control test also is used to determine employment status for the
purpose of workers' compensation claims. See, e.g., In re Galloway's Case, 354 Mass. 427,
237 N.E.2d 663 (1968); In re Brigham's Case, 348 Mass. 140,202 N.E.2d 597 (1964). The
test also is used for determining eligibility under Massachusetts's Employment Security Act
(MASS. GEN. L. ch. ISlA, § 2 (1986». See Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding
Ass'n v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 327 Mass. 296, 98 N.E.2d 361 (1951).
73. Kelley v. Rossi, 395 Mass. 659, 661, 481 N.E.2d 1340, 1342 (1985). The court
cited § 220 of the Restatement which provides the definition of a servant. That section
reads, in part:
In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent
contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement; the master may exercise over
the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools,
and the pla·ce of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and
servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
74. Kelley, 395 Mass. at 664-65, 481 N.E.2d at 1344. The court in Steinberg also
considered these factors. Steinberg, 395 Mass. at 669, 481 N.E.2d at 1347.
Because employment relationships differ greatly among trades and professions, refer
ence to other employment situations is of little value in determining what factors are criti
cal in establishing employer control. For instance, the indicia of an oil company's control
over a franchise station: (a) "exclusive sales agreements," (b) "clean restroom clauses,"
and (c) "opportunities for the oil companies to suggest retail prices," Note, An Efficiency
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control test with respect to the MTCA, if a public hospital controls
these three factors, then the physician is a "public employee."75 The
court also considered ancillary factors such as source of payment,76
and the parties' beliefs regarding the right to control. 77 However, if
the primary factors are missing, these ancillary factors do not seem to
create a public employment relationship.78
1.

Analysis of the Direction and Control Test

In Kelley v. Rossi 79 and Smith v. Steinberg,80 the court resolved
the immunity issue by reviewing the facts of each case and analyzing
whether the physicians were under the direction and control of the
commonwealth. In implementing this approach, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court took a general statutory immunity scheme
which centered on the ambiguous term "public employee," and im
properly interposed a common law definition for that term without
regard to the specific circumstances of the situation. The court did not
take into account the peculiar nature of physician-hospital employ
ment relationships or the policies and interests that application of the
common law test impacts.
The supreme judicial court did not articulate its reasons for
choosing the control factors that it did in determining the physicians'
Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law of Agency, 91 YALE L.J. 168, 193 (1981)
(citations omitted), have no relevance to physician-hospital relationships.
75. See Kelley, 395 Mass. at 661, 481 N.E.2d at 1342.
76. In Steinberg, the supreme judicial court evaluated two aspects of the physician's
compensation scheme as having a bearing on the commonwealth-physician employment
relationship. Steinberg, 395 Mass. at 668-69, 481 N.E.2d at 1346-47 (1985). First, at the
time that he treated Mrs. Smith, Dr. Steinberg was being paid from funds coJlected by the
group practice. In analyzing the statute that created the group practice plan, MASS. GEN.
L. ch. 75, § 34 (1974), the court noted that plan participants were "entitled to 'the same
privileges and benefits of other employees of the commonwealth,' " even though their sala
ries were not paid from public funds. Steinberg, 395 Mass. at 668, 481 N.E.2d at 1346
(quoting Mass. St. 1974, ch. 733, § 6 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. L. ch. 75, § 14
(1986»). The supreme judicial court dismissed this language, emphasizing that the earlier
statute did not control the meaning of "public employee" in the MTCA. Id. Second, the
court took account of the fact that Dr. Steinberg'S compensation from the group practice
was dependent partiaJly upon his productivity. The supreme judicial court stated that these
factors demonstrated uncertainty as to whether Dr. Steinberg was a "public employee" for
purposes of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. ld. at 669, 481 N.E.2d at 1347.
77. The supreme judicial court acknowledged that Dr. Rossi believed that she was an
employee of Boston City Hospital, although it was not persuaded by this fact. Kelley, 395
Mass. at 665, 481 N.E.2d at 1344.
78. The court analyzed the three primary factors in both Kelley and Steinberg, but
considered the anciJlary factors in only one case or the other.
79. 395 Mass. 659, 481 N.E.2d 1340 (1985).
80. 395 Mass. 666, 481 N .E.2d 1344 (1985).
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employment status in Kelley and Steinberg. An examination of the
physicians' profession and their relations with hospitals reveals that
these factors may have been chosen because they are the few areas in
which a physician is subject to the control of others. In fact, the phy
sician's profession is noted for being one of particular autonomy. Jus
tice Holmes once wrote, "There is no more distinct calling than that of
the doctor, and none in which the employee is more distinctly free
from the control or direction of his employer."81
Because it is the individual physician who controls the "content"
of his or her work,82 the efficacy of the direction and control test is
questionable as applied to them. In other cases in which the govern
ment has used the direction and control test to determine liability
under the MTCA or other laws, the nature of the profession or trade
under examination has been more conducive to "control" analysis.
In his advisory letters, Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti ap
plied the direction and control test to a few employment circum
stances to determine liability under the MTCA. The Attorney
General once applied it to individuals who provide consultant services
to the Executive Office of Energy Resources (EOER) on a contractual
basis. The Attorney General suggested that these individuals would
be covered by the immunity of the MTCA because the consultants
performed tasks under the direct supervision of other EOER employ
ees. 83 In a letter regarding individuals who perform volunteer work
for the commonwealth, the Attorney General maintained that the par
ticular circumstances of each case control the liability question, but if
the "public employer" controlled the "manner" and "detail" of the
performance of required tasks, the volunteers probably would be con
sidered "public employees" for purposes of the MTCA.84
81. Pearl v. West End St. Ry. Co., 176 Mass. 177, 179,57 N.E. 339, 339 (1900). In
fact, the Kelley court observed that "physician[s] must use independent judgment," and
that" '[t]he position of a physician normally is not that of a servant of anyone.'" Kelley,
395 Mass. at 662, 481 N.E.2d at 1343 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Scholars on the medical profession also contend that physicians are not subject to
meaningful direction and control. Eliot Friedson wrote that "physician[s] ... [are] the most
prominent among members of generally recognized professions," E. FRIEDSON, PROFES
SIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE 81 (1970), largely be
cause they are "free to control the cOlllelll of ... [their] work." Id. at 84. See also M.
SHAPIRO, supra note 65, at 182-205 (medicine is an alienated and authoritarian field); J.
MCCORMICK, THE DOCTOR: FATHER FIGURE OR PLUMBER 13-14 (1979); Mechanic,
Problems in the FUllire Organization of Medical Practice, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
233, 236 (1970).
82. See E. FRIEDSON, supra note 81, at 84.
83. 1983-84 Op. Att'y. Gen. of Mass. 91, 93 (Nov. IS, 1983).
84. 1983-84 Op. Att'y. Gen. of Mass. 87, 89-90 (July 14, 1983).
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Massachusetts case law dealing with the application of the direc
tion and control test, although not with the issue of employment status
under the MTCA, also involves employment circumstances in which
the employees are not known for having decisionmaking or decision
implementation autonomy in the performance of their jobs. 85 Such
cases involve truck drivers,86 temporary secretaries,87 and student
nurses. 88 In each of these cases, the employer could control the details
of the employee's performance 89-physicians are not subject to similar
control.90 Therefore, the supreme judicial court probably chose the
control factors that it did in Kelley and Rossi because the nature of the
medical profession dictates that a physician control the details of his
or her work. The court chose the few factors in which health care
facilities do have control over the physician's employment.
a.

A Hypothetical Situation
It seems that in Kelley and Steinberg, the court assumed that the

method for defining "public employee" was consistent among various
employment circumstances, and that the application of the common
law definition satisfied the purposes of the Act in all circumstances. 91
85. An exception to this proposition is Florio v. Kennedy, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 917,
464 N.E.2d 1373 (1984), in which the court did apply the direction and control test to
determine that a physician was protected by immunity under the MTCA. However, that
physician worked exclusively for the commonwealth, id. at 918, 464 N.E.2d at 1375, and
this article does not analyze the merit of applying the MTCA to these physicians.
86. Pemberton v. Boas, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1015,433 N.E.2d 490 (1982).
87. In re Galloway's Case, 354 Mass. 427, 237 N.E.2d 663 (1968).
88. In re Brewer's Case, 335 Mass. 601, 141 N.E.2d 281 (1957).
89. Cj 1983-84 Op. Att'y. Gen. of Mass. 87 (July 14, 1983). In this letter regarding
volunteers who perform services for the commonwealth, the Attorney General stated that
if the volunteer is told to "accomplish an agreed result and to control the means to that
result," then he or she would not be a "public employee" under the MTCA. Id. at 89.
90. In Kelley, the supreme judicial court cited the Restatement (Second) of Agency
as authority to refine the elements of control. However, careful analysis of the Restatement
reveals that the nature of the physicians' profession is antithetical to the existence of "con
trol" in Restatement terms. See supra note 73 for the text of the Restatement. The physi
cian is a member of a highly skilled, distinct profession in which the work generally is
performed by a specialist who is not supervised in the details of his or her work. See supra
note 81 and accompanying text. These factors are inconsistent with the criteria for estab
lishing "control" under the Restatement.
91. Cf W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1942).
"The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules,
and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely
the same scope in all of them runs all through legal discussions. It has all the
tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against."
Id. at 159. The situation involving the MTCA varies slightly from the situation described
by Walter Wheeler Cook, but an interesting comparison can be drawn. Rather than assum
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Consider the following hypothetical situations which illustrate the dif
ficulties and inequities that a fact finder faces in distinguishing be
tween public employment and private independent practice using the
supreme judicial court's common law direction and control test.
Doctor Silver is on the staff of the Massachusetts Public Hospital
(MPH) where he is employed by the hospital and retains an office as a
private practitioner. In his employment with the hospital, Dr. Silver
spends three days a week in the emergency room where the hospital
schedules his hours, assigns him the patients that he must treat, and
pays him on a per patient basis. Doctor Silver's employment contract
states that he is an employee of the hospital, but he must pay his own
health and malpractice insurance and is responsible for arranging and
funding his own retirement plan.
One year ago, a private patient of Dr. Silver's called him at his
office and complained that she was not feeling well. Doctor Silver in
structed the patient to go to the emergency room at MPH the next
day, when Dr. Silver was scheduled to work. The physician further
instructed the patient to request that she be treated by him, knowing
that in the past his patients who requested his services were assigned
to him.
The following day, the patient did go to the emergency room,
went through all of the usual administrative procedures, and told the
receptionist that Dr. Silver had instructed her to request his services.
The receptionist then assigned the patient to Dr. Silver.
Doctor Silver examined his patient and ordered a number of labo
ratory tests. After the examination, but without seeing the test results,
Dr. Silver sent the patient home with instructions that were based on a
speculative diagnosis. Five days later, the patient died because she did
not receive necessary care after the alleged improper diagnosis and
treatment. The results from the tests that Dr. Silver had ordered, 
which clearly indicated the impropriety of Dr. Silver's diagnosis, were
available on the same day as his examination of the patient. The pa
tient's family filed a malpractice action against Dr. Silver and he has
ing that the definition of a word was the same in one or more legal rules, the court in Kelley
and Steinberg assumed that a definition of a word in a legal rule was the same in one or
more factual settings. Specifically, the court assumed that the definition of a "public em
ployee" in complex physician-hospital relationships was the same as in all other employ
ment circumstances. The peculiar nature of the physicians' profession makes it
significantly distinguishable from others; thus, the rule that applies to other trades and
professions should not be applied to physicians without careful analysis of its implications.
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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defended the suit by claiming immunity as a "public employee" under
the MTCA.
Doctor Charcoal is employed by MPH in the same capacity as
Dr. Silver. Doctor Charcoal works three days a week in the hospital
emergency room according to hours set by MPH. The hospital assigns
her patients and pays her on a per patient basis. The balance of Dr.
Charcoal's work week is spent as a private practitioner in her leased
office in another part of the hospital, just as Dr. Silver's is. In fact, all
other aspects of her employment relationship with MPH are the same
as Dr. Silver's.
Curiously, about one year ago, Dr. Charcoal received a phone call
from one of her private patients who complained of mysterious pains.
Fearing the worst, Dr. Charcoal told the patient to go to the MPH
emergency room immediately. The patient, however, waited until the
following day to go to MPH, where he followed the standard admis
sion procedures. By chance, the patient was assigned to Dr. Charcoal.
Doctor Charcoal examined the patient and ordered a battery of
laboratory tests. However, before consulting the test results, which
were available while the patient was in the hospital, Dr. Charcoal dis
charged the patient and sent him home with some instructions. Un
fortunately, the patient died a few days later. The test results which
Dr. Charcoal did not look at before the patient's death mandated a
diagnosis different than the physician's. In fact, Dr. Charcoal's diag
nosis and instructions delayed necessary treatment that most probably
would have saved the patient's life.
Upon learning of the physician's apparent misdiagnosis, the dece
dent's family filed a malpractice suit against Dr. Charcoal. The physi
cian filed a defense to the suit claiming immunity as a "public
employee" under the MTCA. In numerous suits with claims similar
to those filed in the suits against Drs. Silver and Charcoal, the average
jury verdict is in excess of $450,000.00.92
92. In a recent Massachusetts case, the appeals court affirmed a trial court decision
in which a jury awarded $480,000.00 to an estate in a malpractice action after a physician
failed to diagnose cancer that eventually killed the patient. Cusher v. Turner, 22 Mass.
App. Ct. 491, 495 N.E.2d 311 (1986).
Many "failure to diagnose" malpractice cases that involve the death of the patient
include a wrongful death claim. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at I, Kelley v. Rossi,
395 Mass. 659, 481 N.E.2d 1340 (1985) (No. 3731); Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 2 n.l,
Smith v. Steinberg, 395 Mass. 666, 481 N.E.2d 1344 (1985) (No. 3789). According to Jury
Verdict Research, Inc., the average wrongful death jury verdict in the United States for a
single male aged 25 to 35 is $526,588.00. 2 JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., PERSONAL
INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS No. 2.97.1, at 4 (1987). The average jury verdict for a
single female aged 30 to 45 is $601,955.00. Id. at No. 2.105.1, at 4.
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Application of the Direction and Control Test

It is likely that Drs. Silver and Charcoal will file motions for sum
mary judgment based on their immunity claims in their respective
cases. It is equally likely that the plaintiffs will object to those mo
tions. In deciding each motion, the trial judge will have to determine
the availability of immunity under the MTCA based on the common
law direction and control test according to the current interpretation
of the MTCA by the supreme judicial court.
In Dr. Silver's case, there is little doubt that two of the three pri
mary factors in the direction and control test as formulated by the
supreme judicial court are satisfied-the physician's hours are set by
the hospital, and he must follow the policies of the hospital while
working in the emergency room. The critical question in Dr. Silver's
case is whether the hospital assigned the deceased patient to the physi
cian. Because Dr. Silver instructed the patient to request his services,
particularly in light of the fact that the physician expected that the
patient could be assigned to him if the patient so requested, it is prob
able that the motion for summary judgment would be denied. There is
a question of material fact as to who selected the patient for Dr. Silver.
As in Dr. Silver's case, in Dr. Charcoal's case the requirements
that the employer set the employee's hours and the policies that the
employee must follow are satisfied. Again, the disposition of the mo
tion for summary judgment depends on who selected the patient for
Dr. Charcoal. It is probable that the motion based on immunity under
the MTCA would be granted in this case. Although Dr. Charcoal
instructed her patient to go to the hospital, she played no role in the
assignment of that patient to herself; the hospital coincidentally as
signed him to Dr. Charcoal. Thus, all three of the primary factors in
the common law test were controlled by the employer, so Dr. Char
coal would be considered a "public employee" and fall under the pur
view of the MTCA.
c.

Critique of the Application

The shortcomings of the common law direction and control test
are well-illustrated by this hypothetical situation. These two cases in
volve physicians with identical employment relationships. Both cases
involve treatment of patients while the physicians were subject to
MPH policy and were being paid by MPH. Is it fair, then, for the
plaintiffs in Dr. Charcoal's case to be limited to a recovery of no
greater than $100,000.00, while the plaintiffs in Dr. Silver's case could
obtain a judgment in excess of $450,000.00, if averages prevail? From
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the defendants' perspective, is it fair for Dr. Charcoal to incur no fi
nancialliability by way of a judgment, while Dr. Silver could be liable
personally for a half million dollar judgment?
Because of the importance afforded to the subtle distinction re
garding the assignment of the patients, these results are highly prob
able, regardless of the unfairness. To the deceased patients' survivors,
and perhaps to the physician who is liable, the distinction between a
patient requesting her physician on that physician's advice and being
assigned to that physician's care, and a patient being assigned to his
physician by chance is meaningless-similarly situated patients were
injured by similarly situated physicians. 93 The consequences dictated
by the common law direction and control test are unjust and the poli
cies behind the MTCA are not well-served. The following examina
tion of the policies underlying a governmental immunity scheme
further delineates the inequities and inefficiencies in the current inter
pretation of the MTCA with respect to physicians.
II.

POLICIES OF AN IMMUNITY SCHEME

In its mandate to the legislature to develop a new governmental
immunity scheme, the supreme judicial court proposed three premises
as a foundation for the legislation. In Whitney v. City of Worcester,94
the court articulated that immunity should be consistent with: 1) "ac
cepted tort principles,"95 2) the "reasonable expectations of the citi
zenry with respect to its government,"96 and 3) limitation on
governmentalliability.97 The court further stated that a viable immu
nity scheme should reflect a balance between fairness to injured citi
zens and retention of a vital government. 98 The following analysis
illustrates that the current immunity scheme under the Massachusetts
Tort Claims Act, as implemented under the direction and control test,
does not satisfy these premises with respect to "gray area" physicians.
93. From the survivor's perspective, there is little doubt that the distinction is mean
ingless and the impact harsh. However, proponents of the current interpretation may ar
gue that the impact on Dr. Silver is justifiable on the supposition that he instructed his
patient to request his services while he was on duty at MPH realizing the liability implica
tions. In other words', Dr. Silver should not be protected by immunity under the MTCA
because he tried to take advantage of that immunity with his private patient.
94. 373 Mass. 208, 366 N.E.2d 12\0 (1977).
95. Id. at 215, 366 N.E.2d at 1214-15.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 212, 366 N.E.2d at 1213 (citing Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth,
363 Mass. 612, 623, 296 N.E.2d 461, 468 (1973)).
98. Id. at 216, 366 N.E.2d at 1215.
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Tort Principles

The primary purposes of tort law are the fair resolution of claims
between adverse parties and the protection of social mores. 99 In a situ
ation where a defendant is found culpable, these purposes are effectu
ated by compensation to the injured party and deterrence of the
defendant and others who may be prone to commit similar acts. Most
likely, it is the tort principles of compensation and deterrence that the
supreme judicial court desired the legislature to consider in formulat
ing an immunity, scheme. 100
Under the current application of the MTCA, the tort principle of
compensation is not satisfied adequately in many cases involving seri
ous medical malpractice. Because recovery is limited statutorily to
$100,000.00 for plaintiffs injured by physicians who are granted im
munity under the MTCA, those plaintiffs who would otherwise obtain
a judgment in excess of $100,000.00 are not compensated ade
quately.101 While this $100,000.00 recovery limit may be necessary for
the economic stability of the commonwealth, it should only apply to
those physicians who work exclusively for the government-it is not
99. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 20-26 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
100. See Whitney v. City of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 215, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1214
15. Although the supreme judicial court was not explicit as to which tort principles it was
referring, based on contemporary commentary on the tort system it can be inferred that the
supreme judicial court intended at least two basic tort principles: compensation and deter
rence. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 99, at 25. The authors note that the
courts are not only concerned about compensation of victims, but are also interested in
admonishing the wrongdoer in order to deter future harm. Liability is one factor that
creates a powerful incentive to avoid or prevent harm. Id. See also Sugarman, Doing Away
with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555 (1985). In Professor Sugarman's opinion, the pres
ent tort scheme is based on three goals: deterrence, compensation, and justice. Although he
takes issue with the deterrence effect of tort liability, Professor Sugarman recognizes the
potential of deterrence in some situations where regulation is most concentrated. Id. at
559. See also R. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE (1969). Professor Keeton asserts
that the weightiest reason for the tort system is fairness in having wrongdoers bear the
burden for the loss to the innocent victims. Id. at 127 (dicussing a theory of liability in the
context of traffic accidents).
101. In 1987, the average jury verdict for physician malpractice nationwide was
$1,294,160.00 with a mid-point verdict of $700,000.00. Telephone conversation with Diane
Weisman of Jury Verdict Research, Inc. (Jan. 26, 1988). Fifty percent of all physician
malpractice verdicts fell within a range from $200,000.00 to $1,540,000.00. Id.
This analysis assumes that juries are competent to decide "adequate" compensation in
medical malpractice litigation. See V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 113-29
Uuries generally are competent). See also A. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS
THE JURY SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY (1984) (general discussion of how juries confront
highly technical cases); Martin & Daniels, Jury Verdicts and the "Crisis" in Civil Justice, II
JUST. Sys. J. 321 (1986) (discussing jury verdicts and the "insurance crisis").
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necessary for "gray area" physicians. 102
The principle of compensation requires that an injured plaintiff be
reimbursed completely for all special damages, and to some extent for
pain and suffering. 103 One presumption underlying the MTCA immu
nity scheme is that "public employees" do not have the resources to
compensate fully those persons whom they injure. 104 This presump
tion is erroneous with respect to "gray area" physicians. "Gray area"
physicians have both the availability of malpractice insurance,105 and
the resources to afford that insurance and to compensate adequately
people whom they negligently injure. 106
102. This article does not analyze the merit of the current application of the MTCA
to physicians who are employed exclusively by the government. See supra note 85. How
ever, some of the arguments and policies in support of the proposition that MTCA immu
nity should not apply to "gray area" physicians are applicable to all physicians.
103. See Dowling v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 168 So. 2d 107 (La. App. 1964).
In that case, the court stated:
"One who is injured by malpractice [or negligence] is entitled to compensation for
all pecuniary losses which he has sustained as a direct and natural result thereof.
Particular elements of compensation may include loss of time, loss of services,
impairment of earning capacity, expenses actually incurred, bodily pain and
mental suffering, and the condition or circumstances of the injured person."
Id. at 117 (citation omitted). See also Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
104. The principles that underlie governmental immunity pursuant to the MTCA
are the same as those principles that underlie the doctrine of respondeat superior. See
Kelley v. Rossi, 395 Mass. 659,661,481 N.E.2d 1340, 1342 (1985); Alves v. Hayes, 381
Mass. 57, 58, 406 N.E.2d 1028, 1029 (1980). A basic premise of respondeat superior is that
the government should be liable for the acts of its servants because the servants likely are
people of modest means. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
105. In 1975, the Massachusetts Legislature created the Joint Underwriting Associa
tion (JUA) in order to provide affordable malpractice insurance to physicians. The JUA is
governed by MASS. GEN. L. ch. 175A, § 5A (1986). Yearly insurance premiums in 1987
range from' $4,719.00 for psychiatrists and general practitioner physicians who do not per
form surgery to $38,828.00 for neurosurgeons and orthopedic surgeons. The coverage that
this insurance provides is one million dollars for a single claim and three million dollars in
total claims per year. Telephone interview with Tracy Gehan, Assistant to Richard Moore,
Public Relations Director at the Joint Underwriting Association (December 3, 1987).
All insurance is issued according to a full-time rate with the exception of insurance for
physicians at three hospitals that have special arrangements with the JUA. Part-time mal
practice insurance is issued to physicians at the University of Massachusetts, Harvard, and
Tufts at a percentage of the rate that is charged to physicians at other hospitals. Telephone
interview with Richard Moore, Public Relations Director at the Joint Underwriting Asso
ciation (February 27, 1986). Maintaining private malpractice insurance is recommended if
the physician sees any private patients, thus even the vast majority of "public employee"
physicians carry such insurance. Telephone interview with Frank G. Chase, Assistant At
torney General, Chief of Torts Division, Commonwealth of Massachusetts (June 10, 1986).
106. Physician income statistics are not available for Massachusetts alone, but Amer
ican Medical Association statistics show that the average annual income of physicians in
1985 was $113,200.00. Gonzalez, Physician Income Trends, 1975-85, in AMERICAN MEDI
CAL ASSOCIATION, SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 17
(1986). Radiologists had the highest income level, with 50% of radiologists earning over
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The second major tort principle that concerned the supreme judi
cial court in Whitney was that of deterrence. The degree of deterrence
produced by lawsuits alleging negligence and resulting in plaintiffs'
judgments is subject to considerable debate.107 Although the value of
deterrence is uncertain, it likely has some value, and thus is a recog
nized goal of the immunity scheme and should be protected. Under
the current interpretation of the MTCA, many "gray area" physicians
are granted immunity and, thus, the opportunity for deterrence
through judicial accountability is reduced significantly as to them.
The argument that personal financial liability acts as a deterrent
to negligent conduct assumes that people will exercise a greater degree
$150,000.00 per year, and pediatricians and general practitioners had the lowest income,
with 50% of them earning less than $70,500.00 per year. Id. at 20.
As an indication of "public employee" physician salaries in Massachusetts, physicians
working full-time for the commonwealth had a salary range from $37,928.80 to $57,524.48
under the collective bargaining agreement that expired September 28,1987. Telephone con
versation with Valian Norris, Labor Management Relations Advisor, Division of Employee
Relations (February 9, 1988). According to Ms. Norris, the tentatively approved collective
bargaining agreement reflects a "substantial increase" in physician salaries. Id.
107. The deterrence aspect of tort law has come under heavy criticism because some
legal writers dispute the effectiveness of liability as a deterrent to negligent medical treat
ment. See Sugarman, supra note 100, at 561 n.12. Professor Sugarman argues that liability
insurance, the inability of employers or organizations to deal with individual incompetence
because they lack strategies to change behavior, the fact that people ignore the threat of
danger because they have an "it won't happen to me" attitude, or situations where individ
uals are motivated to satisfy personal needs regardless of risk 'of injury to another, all un
dermine the deterrence aspect of tort law. Id. See also Grad, Medical Malpractice and Its
Implications/or Public Health, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH POLICY, 397-402 (R. Roe·
mer and G. McKray eds. 1980) (conceding that liability insurance defeats deterrence im
plicit in medical malpractice because it insulates physicians from financial responsibility for
mistakes). This insulation occurs because physicians who have been found to be negligent
often do not pay a higher insurance premium and if their insurance costs do increase it is a
tax-deductible item on the physicians' tax returns as an "ordinary and necessary" business
expense. I.R.C. § 162 (1986).
However, there is substantial support for the position that tort law can deter negligent
medical liability. See, e.g., Special Features, The Costs 0/ Malpractice Litigation, 70 MINN.
MED. 129-30 (1987) (discussing financial and psychological costs of defending a medical
malpractice claim); Mechanic, Some Social Aspects 0/ the Medical Malpractice Dilemma,
1975 DUKE L.J. 1177, 1179-80 (asserting that medical malpractice claims deter physicians
by providing a stigma which encourages prudent behavior); Strodel, Piercing the Veil 0/
Silence in Malpractice Litigation, in QUALITY MEDICAL CARE-THE CITIZEN'S RIGHT
114 (Ass'n of Trial Law. of Am., Vol. I (1975)) (advancing the proposition that each well
founded malpractice claim upgrades medical care because physicians do not forget personal
liability, thereby reducing the likelihood of repetition). See also CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY
SELECT COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PRELIMINARY REPORT (WAXMAN
REPORT), at 150, 180 (1974). Chairman Henry A. Waxman reported that because mal
practice liability is based on the failure of a physician to conform to a reasonable standard
of care, malpractice litigation encourages the medical profession to practice quality
medicine. The committee found that this fear of malpractice litigation motivated health
care providers to be more careful. Id.
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of care if they know that they will be liable monetarily for the harm
that they cause. This financial deterrence probably will not affect
"gray area" physicians' conduct because their liability insurance
removes the threat of serious personal financial loss. However, fear of
undesirable publicity, costs of defending a claim, \08 and the stigma
from a judicial finding of fault most likely will deter future negligent
conduct of the defendant and other physicians. \09 Because of this
probability, the courts should be hesitant to grant immunity to "gray
area" physicians.
The need for deterrence through full judicial accountability is bol
stered by the fact that the medical profession is largely self-regu
lated.! \0 Unlike other .governmental operations where employer
supervision and governmental oversight can deter negligent conduct,
the highly technical nature of medicine requires that physicians police
themselves through peer review boards.!!! Although these boards
108. Both financial and psychological costs. See supra note 107.
109. Even though Professor Sugarman asserts that the deterrence rationale of tort
law is overemphasized, he concedes that tort law may deter negligent medical practice
because of official determinations of liability, fear of undesirable publicity, and the costs of
defending one's position regardless of whether there is a settlement or a full trial.
Sugarman, supra note 100, at 560-61. See also Grad, supra note 107, at 401 (a medical
malpractice suit affects a physician's behavior because of its threat to one's professional
reputation and self-esteem because his or her judgment is questioned and criticized);
Mechanic, supra note 107, at 2 (stigma of a lawsuit along with the anxiety, lost time, and
uncertainty that litigation produces are significant deterrents to carelessness in medical
treatment); R. KEETON, supra note 100, at 153 (formal legal proceedings which identify
negligent conduct put a "mark of legal disapproval" on such conduct, thereby influencing
the wrongdoer's future conduct and the conduct of others who know about the litigation).
110. Although the efficacy of self-regulation in controlling physician conduct is ques
tionable, self-regulation probably is necessary for physicians. In Kelley, the supreme judi
cial court discussed the discordant relationship between physicians' needs to exercise their
independent judgment while treating patients and the requirements that employers control
the physicians' activities, and the court stated that" 'a physician normally is not ... a
servant of anyone.''' Kelley v. Rossi, 395 Mass. 659, 662, 481 N.E.2d 1340, 1342-43
(1985) (citation omitted). See also Janulis & Hornstein, Damned If You Do, Damned If
You Don't: Hospitals' Liability for Physician Malpractice, 64 NEB. L. REV. 689 (1985).
Janulis and Hornstein point out the problems that arise with a hospital controlling physi
cians' activities. Hospital administrators cannot change or delay care ordered by physi
cians, and because most medical care must be carried out promptly to assure adequate
patient treatment, the hospital cannot even prospectively review physicians' orders. Addi
tionally, hospitals cannot select the best treatment if several acceptable alternatives are
available because the choice is the physicians.' See id.at 717-18. See also Note, Independ
ent Duty ofa Hospital to Prevent Physicians' Malpractice, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 953, 963 (1973).
111. . These peer review boards can exist within a particular hospital or on a broader
level. The organization in Massachusetts that is responsible for statewide oversight is the
Board of Registration in Medicine, which is governed by MASS. GEN. L. ch. 13, § 10
(1986). The board consists of seven members, five of whom must be physicians. The board
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may have some deterrent effect, 112 their impact is questionable because
of the reluctance of physicians to report misconduct and to sanction
their peers. 113 Therefore, physician responsibility must be ameliorated
through judicial accountability.
The supreme judicial court in Kelley explained that "[t]he legal
principles that govern the determination whether the doctor was a
'public employee' . . . are the same as those that have determined
whether an agent is a servant for whose negligent acts a principal may
is charged with the duty of licensing and regulating the conduct of physicians in Massachu
setts. Id.
112. Peer review offers several benefits in policing the profession and identifying sub
standard care. Peer review committees have access to relevant information, medical exper
tise, and have some power to impose sanctions on physicians who do not meet professional
standards. See Grad, supra note 107, at 417 n.20 (agreeing that hospital supervision of
physicians' work has increased over the last few years-but doubting its effectiveness in
weeding out incompetents); Note, supra note 110, at 965-66.
In Massachusetts, the Board of Registration in Medicine has the power to impose
sanctions, including license revocation. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 243, § 1.05(2) (1987).
113. The reluctance of physicians to report misconduct of their colleagues is, per
haps, the most dubious aspect of peer review. A recent survey of physicians in Texas re
vealed that only 15% of the respondents felt that a physician's first occurrence of
unnecessary surgery or treatment should be reported to the Board of Medical Examiners,
and only 32% would report the first occurrence of negligent surgery. Peer Review in Texas:
A Survey of Medical Stajft, TEX. MED., Mar. 1987, at 91, 92. Additionally, just slightly
over one-half of the respondents thought that recurring negligent surgery 'should be re
ported. Id. The same survey showed that only 23% of the physicians thought that the
State Board of Medical Examiners was a "very effective" quality assurance mechanism,
while 28% indicated that the board was "not very effective" and 44% said it was "some
what effective." Id. at 91.
A similar problem has been reported in Michigan, where the examining board received
just 225 allegations of misconduct in 1986 in a state with 20,000 physicians. Board of
Medicine Received 225 Allegations Last Year, 86 MICH. MED. 233, 234 (1987). An admin
istrator of the board stated, "[T]he primary reason we do not investigate more cases is that
we just don't get the allegations we should be getting. We get practically no allegations
from feIlow professionals, either individually or as part of a hospital staff organization, and
we get none from professional organizations." Id. See also W. ROBERTSON, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: A PREVENTIVE ApPROACH 154 (1985).
The problem, however, extends beyond adequate reporting of misconduct. There is
concern that examining boards which are comprised, at least in part, of physicians (the
Massachusetts board must have at least five physicians on its seven member board, MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 13, § 10 (1986» may be biased in favor of physicians. The physicians on the
boards may not be willing to criticize and sanction the accused because of previous profes
sional relationships with that person or because of empathy toward the individual. It is
possible that there may be a problem similar to what Professor Spece found in Arizona
medical malpractice panels which consisted, in part, of physicians. Professor Spece re
ported that, "[p]anels [with physician members] find in favor of defendants in a dispropor
tionate number of cases, and physician panelists are the least likely to find in favor of a
plaintiff." Spece, The Case Against (Arizona) Medical Malpractice Panels, 63 U. DET. L.
REV. 7, 72 (1985). See also Kendall, Expectations, Imperfect Markets, and Medical Mal
practice Insurance, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 167, 190 (S. Rotten
berg ed. 1978) (the record of physicians' policing themselves is "indefensible'").
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be liable under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior." I 14
In this regard, the current interpretation of the term "public em
ployee" in the MTCA may not be consistent with accepted tort princi
ples. Arguably, including "gray area" physicians within the scope of
MTCA immunity does not satisfy the tort principles underlying the
doctrine of respondeat superior.
The foundation of respondeat superior is the policy that the em
ployer is better able to bear the costs resulting from the employee's
negligence, and that, the employer has effective means of controlling,
and in proper circumstances deterring, the employee's conduct. lls As
this article has pointed out, however, these policies are not served by
granting immunity to "gray area" physicians. Although medical facil
ities likely have deeper pockets than individual physicians, the concern
that the physician will not have the means to compensate negligently
injured patients is unrealistic because of the availability of malpractice
insurance and the physicians' ability to afford that insurance. I 16 Also,
unlike most trades where respondeat superior has been applied, the
nature of medical practice does not lend itself to control of its
"content." 117
In his article, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 118 Alan Sykes
argues that the efficiency of the vicarious liability, as imposed through
the control test, could improve if attention were focused on at least
two policies-agent insolvency and the relative risk-bearing capacity
of the parties-that are analogous to the two policies offered above for
not applying MTCA immunity to "gray area" physicians-the availa
bility of compensation resources to physicians and the inability of
health care facilities to control the physicians' work. 119 Sykes suggests
that vicarious liability is inefficient when the agent has the ability to
pay a judgment against himself or herself, and when there is a high
transaction cost to the principal because the principal is unable to
114. Kelley, 395 Mass. at 661, 481 N.E.2d at 1342.
115. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 70, 105-06 and accompanying text. See also James, supra note
71, at 171 (rationalizing that the master should compensate the victims of his or her ser
vant's negligence because the master has liability insurance available).
117. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
118. Sykes, supra note 71.
119. See id. at 1259-80. See also supra notes 81, 105-06 and accompanying text.
Sykes' contentions are pertinent to the application of MTCA immunity to "gray area"
physicians because the activities of physicians that are likely to cause injuries to their pa
tients are the "details" of the physicians' work, rather than the administrative factors
which the hospital may control. See R. GOTS, THE TRUTH ABOUT MEDICAL MALPRAC
TICE 186 (1975) (a prominent cause of medical malpractice is "careless medicine" due to
errors in judgment and shortcuts).
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monitor the loss-avoidance behavior of the agent. 120 He further claims
that the control test is ineffective in analyzing these factors.121
Therefore, because of the ability of "gray area" physicians to sat
isfy judgments against them, and the inability of hospitals to reduce
their risk and transaction costs because of their lack of control over
the details of physicians' work, determination of physician immu
nity-and government liability-through application of the control
test does not effectively address the tort principles behind the doctrine
of respondeat superior. Thus, the MTCA immunity scheme is incon
sistent with accepted tort principles.
In summary, the tort principles of compensation and deterrence
are not safeguarded sufficiently under the current interpretation of the
MTCA. Many persons who are injured seriously by medical malprac
tice do not receive adequate compensation because of the statutory
limit on recovery. 122 The protection of persons injured by "public em
ployees" who do not have sufficient resources to satisfy a judgment is
not a legitimate concern with respect to "gray area" physicians. Addi
tionally, because health care facilities cannot control the details of the
physicians' work, extension of immunity to "gray area" physicians
eliminates an effective process for deterring medical malpractice. The
tort principles underlying the theory of respondent superior also are
not well-served. The current application of immunity under the
MTCA by way of the direction and control test does not account for
these factors and, thus, is prone to inefficiency and injustice.
B.

Public Expectations

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's concern that an im
munity scheme be consistent with public expectations of govern
ment l23 probably is related to, and perhaps is overlapping with, the
concern of protecting accepted tort principles. Indeed, tort law is
founded upon public perception of appropriate social behavior. 124 The
most basic of these expectations is that one not be injured by the negli
gent conduct of a person working within the government.
In the context of health care services, this expectation can be de
120. See generally Sykes, supra note 7 I.
121. Id. at 1279-80. See also Note, supra note 74, at 192-93 ("[T]he control test is
inappropriate, and its legal implications bear no predictable relationship to economic
efficiency. ").
122. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
123. Whitney v. City of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 216-17,366 N.E.2d 12\0, 1214
15(1977).
124. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 99, at 6-7.
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fined further as an expectation of quality care at a cost that is not
unduly burdensome to society.125 Perhaps the nature of the service
provided is the most compelling reason to treat physicians differently
than other government employees with respect to immunity under the
MTCA. Aside from the autonomous and authoritarian nature of the
physicians' profession, there is the concern that quality medical care is
a necessity for all citizens, and when the quality of care is compro
mised the results literally can involve life and death. 126 Thus, it is the
expectation of the public that highest quality health care not be com
promised. This expectation is not met most effectively when physi
cians are not held personally responsible for their negligence because
there are no satisfactory alternatives to personal judicial
accountability. 127
Additionally, patients seeking care from physicians usually are
vulnerable; 128. it does not matter whether the physicians are employed
by public or private hospitals. The patients' knowledge and experi
ence with increasingly complex modern medicines and their physical
or mental states offen condition them to surrender their well-being to
125. Because some patients do not have health insurance and cannot pay the costs of
hospitalization, the costs of medical services for these patients are borne by others. Massa
chusetts has an uncompensated care pool designed to "more equitably distribute the burden
of financing uncompensated acute hospital services." MASS. GEN. L. ch. 6A, § 75 (1986).
A portion of each hospital's "gross patient service revenue" is dedicated to funding the
uncompensated care pool. Id. Because this type of economic burden is satisfied by medical
service consumers, additional costs by way of government liability must be constrained.
126. Although the matter of life and death is present in other trades and professions,
such as emergency medical services, firefighting, and police services, those jobs are not as
autonomous as that of a physician. The details of the work in the other trades and profes
sions are controlled by supervisors and formal policies and regulations, whereas the details
of a physician's work are controlled, if at all, by the standards of accepted practice as
determined by the board of examiners. See supra notes 81-90, 110-13 and accompanying
text.
127. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text discussing deterrence of medical
malpractice and the ineffectiveness of peer review by physicians.
128. See W. GLASSER, CONTROL THEORY 216 (1984). Glasser asserts that health
care in the United States today causes each patient to feel a definite loss of control because
the patient's responsibility ends after relating symptoms to the physician, who then takes
command of the treatment. See also Price, Health System Agencies and Peer Review Orga
nizations: Experiments in Regulating the Delivery of Health Care, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
HEALTH POLICY (R. Roemer & G. McKray eds. 1980). Medical consumers usually do not
have the expertise to make informed choices; therefore, it is the physician who determines
the patient's need for return visits, hospitalization, the need for consulting physicians, and
the necessity for surgery. Id. l!.t 361. Compare B. HOSFORD, MAKING YOUR MEDICAL
DECISIONS (1982). Many patients are still meek about medical decisions and allow their
physicians to dominate the relationship. However, there is a growing number of educated
consumers who are capable of understanding medical options and who demand to make
their own medical decisions. [d. at 2-6, 177.
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their physicians without question. 129 Because of the inability of pa
tients to understand completely the technical aspects of their condi
tions and treatments, they establish relationships of trust and
dependence with their physicians. 130 As a result of this unusual vul
nerability and trust reposed in the physicians, patients expect that they
will be compensated fully for injuries that result from a breach of this
relationship.13I However, if a "gray area" physician breaches this re
lationship of trust and is found to be a "public employee" under the
direction and control interpretation, the patient's expectation of full
compensation is not met if the damages exceed $100,000.00.
Related to ever-increasing complexity in medical care is the rising
cost of medical services. If negligently injured patients are going to be
compensated fully, the increasing cost of medical services necessarily
increases the amount that plaintiffs should receive.132 Illustratively,
the average physician malpractice jury verdict in the United States
was $244,607.00 in 1981. 133 By 1987, this figure had skyrocketed to
129. W. GLASSER, supra note 128, at 218. Traditionally, patients have given up con
trol of their health with the idea that their physicians can cure them. Id.
Doctor Arthur Caplan of the Hastings Center perceives the problems of medical spe
cialization and its effects on physician-patient relationships this way:
Not only is professional sovereignty propped up by a cult of mystery within the
profession, but health care is now delivered in settings that are themselves distant,
mysterious, complex, imposing and awe inspiring both in size and in technologi
cal ritual. As medicine becomes, and is encouraged to be become, increasingly
faceless and bureaucratic in the name of cost containment, efficacy, and competi
tion, as fewer and fewer patients know or have any sort of personal, intimate
relationship with a specific physician, the prospects for conversation and open
communication become increasingly dim.
Caplan, Can We Talk? A Review of Jay Katz, "The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, "
9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 43, 44 (1987).
130. See Chapman, The Relationship Between Law and Medicine, in LEGAL
MEDICINE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING 2 (1980) ("The funda
mental principle of medical practice is a relationship of trust between physician and pa
tient."); Stacey v. Pantano, 177 Neb. 694, 697, 131 N.W.2d 163, 165 (1964) ("Mutual
confidence and trust are essentials of the relationship between physician and patient.") (ci
tations omitted).
131. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 137, at 560-61
(1935) (when a duty is breached tort law requires full compensation); RESTATEMENT (SEC
OND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979). See also supra note 103.
132. The United States Department of Labor's Consumer Price Index for physician
services increased 122.43% from 1975 to 1984, while the Consumer Price Index for all
items increased 92.99% during that same period. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERV., HEALTH UNITED STATES 1985 126 (1985). Also, in Massachusetts, the per capita
expenditure for personal health care increased from $760.00 in 1976 to $1508.00 in 1982.
Id. at 130.
133. 2 JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., INJURY VALUATION REPORTS No. 251, at
1203 (1981).
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$1,294,160.00. 134 Therefore, the inclusion of some "gray area" physi
cians under the MTCA immunity scheme, and the limitation of recov
ery to $100,000.00, defeats the public's expectation of full
compensation for many negligently injured persons. 135
An alternative to satisfy the public's expectation of full compen
sation would be to eliminate the $100,000.00 recovery cap for "gray
area" physicians. However, this approach would compromise a differ
ent public interest-that public medical care be provided at a cost that
is not unduly burdensome to society. If the recovery cap were elimi
nated, the state and local governments would shoulder the burden of
the larger judgments obtained by persons injured by "gray area" phy
sicians who are granted immunity. A more effective process of com
pensation, which satisfies both public expectations of full
compensation and minimal taxpayer burden, is to deny immunity to
all "gray area" physicians and to permit plaintiffs to recover against
the negligent physicians in their individual capacities.
This approach to physician liability satisfies another public expec
tation-that of personal accountability for wrongful conduct. To
some extent related to the tort principle of deterrence is the expecta
tion of injured patients that negligent physicians will be held person
ally responsible for their actions. 136 If consistently applied, this
accountability, whether financial or social, will promote a higher de
gree of care in the distribution of medical services. If immunity from
prosecution is granted to "gray area" physicians this expectation is not
met.
In summary, the current interpretation of the MTCA immunity
scheme is not consistent with the public's expectations of government
services and liability in the medical field. A more effective way to sat
isfy these expectations would be to deny personal immunity to all
"gray area" physicians, thereby imposing personal accountability
upon them and requiring that they use their own resources to compen
sate the persons whom they negligently injure.
134. Telephone conversation with Diane Weisman of Jury Verdict Research, Inc.
(Jan. 26, 1988). In 1984, the average medical malpractice jury verdict in Massachusetts
was $236,848.00. Sunday Republican (Springfield, Mass.), Dec. 22, 1985, at A-34, col. 4.
135. In 1987, 50% of all jury awards for physician malpractice fell within a range
from $200,000.00 to $\,540,000.00. Telephone conversation with Diane Weisman of the
Jury Verdict Research, Inc. (Jan. 26, 1988).
136. See R. KEETON, supra note 100, at 127. Robert Keeton discusses the "fault
system" of tort liability and argues that the weightiest reason for liability is fairness, and
that most people believe that wrongdoers should bear the burden of loss for the innocent
victim.
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Government Liability

The supreme judicial court in Whitney noted that Massachusetts
was one of only five states that retained common law immunity at both
the state and local levels. 137 While strongly urging the legislature to
~bolish immunity, it also stated that there should be limits on govern
mental liability. 138 The exclusion of "gray area" physicians from the
purview of the MTCA as "public employees" achieves both of the
court's goals of reducing the reach of common law immunity and lim
iting governmental liability.
The government has a number of interests that must be addressed
with regard to a viable immunity scheme. Perhaps the most obvious
government interest is fiscal stability; generally, if immunity is abol
ished the government assumes the burden of compensating those per
sons injured in the execution of governinental functions.139 Under the
existing interpretation of the term "public employee" in the MTCA,
the government does, indeed, assume potential liability for the medical
malpractice of many "gray area" physicians. As discussed previously,
this liability is not necessary because physicians' private malpractice
insurance benefits could provide negligently injured patients with full
compensation. l40 Thus, the governmental interest in fiscal stability is
protected most effectively by excluding all "gray area" physicians
from personal immunity.
Similar to the public's expectation, the government has an inter
est in ensuring quality medical care in the commonwealth. A respon
sible system of medical service will maintain a healthy population,
thus minimizing the demand on social welfare agencies. To create a
137. Whitney, 373 Mass. at 212, 366 N.E.2d at 12\3.
138. !d. The court declared that the legislature should adopt an immunity scheme
that strikes a balance between "fairness to injured persons and ... promoting effective
government." Id. at 216, 366 N.E.2d at 1215. There were two primary concerns for pro
moting an effective government, according to the court. One, that there be funds to com
pensate negligently injured persons, and, two, that the policy development mechanisms of
the commonwealth not be burdened unduly. See id. at 216-17, 366 N.E.2d at 1215. In
Whitney, the court did not expound upon the fiscal concern, but simply stated that there
were funds to compensate victims of negligence in the performance of public functions. Id.
at 217, 366 N.E.2d at 1215. However, the court discussed at length the necessity that a
government immunity scheme protect the discretionary planning process of government.
Id. at 217, 366 N.E.2d at 1215-16. As a result of this concern, the legislature provided for
an exception to government liability for certain circumstances in which the "public em
ployee" performs a discretionary function. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258, § \O(b) (1986).
139. The supreme judicial court in Morash warned of the potential fiscal harm that
could be created by complete elimination of immunity. Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Common
wealth, 363 Mass. 612, 623 n.6, 296 N.E.2d 461, 468 n.6 (1973).
140. See supra notes \05-06 and accompanying text.
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responsible system of health service distribution there must be a pro
cess for personal accountability to promote careful diagnosis and treat
ment of the sick and injured. Personal accountability will most
effectively deter negligent conduct. 141 The existing interpretation of
the MTCA which provides immunity for many "gray area" physicians
diminishes the opportunity for deterrence. The state interest in pro'
moting quality medical care is better served by denying personal im
munity . to all "gray area" physicians and by stressing personal
accountability for negligent acts.
The government has another interest with respect to personallia
bility of its employees which some would argue is a reason to maintain
immunity for "gray area" physicians: attracting qualified persons to
government service. Although this argument may be appropriate in
some fields of government service it may not be persuasive with re
spect to physicians.
Physicians are in a unique situation as compared to many others
who work, at least in part, for the state. Because physicians, in partic
ular "gray area" physicians, carry private medical malpractice insur
ance, it is not necessary to provide personal immunity to protect them
from tremendous financial loss. 142 If they do commit an error in judg
ment they are protected from financial devastation by their malprac
tice insurance policy.143 Thus, because "gray area" physicians already
have the protection of private malpractice insurance, it is unnecessary
to use personal immunity to lure them into civil service. 144
141. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
142. Because the JUA does not issue malpractice insurance for part-time work ex
cept in a few limited exceptional circumstances, and because most physicians in Massachu
setts carry private malpractice insurance, see supra note 105, the proposition that immunity
is necessary to attract physicians to public service is questionable. In most cases, physi
cians do not incur extra liability or save on insurance premiums by working within a public
hospital.
143. Although the use of a malpractice insurance policy for protection may not be as
attractive as personal immunity, the interests of fairness to the injured party and other
factors concerning government efficiency, as previously discussed, outweigh the physicians'
concerns.
144. Of course, there are costs other than financial ones in defending malpractice
claims. See supra note 109. However, these costs may be outweighed by the benefits of
working for the government, such as the security of a steady patient load as opposed to the
uncertain workload in private practice. "Gray area" physicians also may be attracted to
public service because of access to equipment and facilities that they cannot afford as pri
vate practitioners.
Additionally, as "public employee" physician salaries rise and become less disparate
with private practitioners' salaries, see supra note 106, it is possible that the ranks of "pub
lic employee" physicians will increase. If that occurs, there should be less demand for
"gray area" physicians, and thus, less Ileed for incentives to attract "gray area" physicians
into public service.
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Therefore, the government interests of a vital economy and qual
ity medical care are best served by an immunity scheme that does not
encompass "gray area" physicians. Furthermore, any adverse affect to
the government's interest in attracting citizens into civil service by de
nying immunity to "gray area" physicians is highly speculative.
III.

REFORMATION OF THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION

The discussion to this point illustrates that the current status of
governmental immunity with respect to "gray area" physicians in
Massachusetts does not conform with principles of justice as outlined
by the supreme judicial court in Whitney. In fact, the current applica
tion of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act to physicians who are not
employed exclusively by a government is flawed in respects that are
disturbingly similar to the common law scheme of immunity which
the MTCA replaced. Immunity under the common law scheme was
based on superficial classifications that had no relation to sound public
policy.145 Similarly, application of the MTCA to "gray area" physi
cians by way of the direction and control test is founded on insubstan
tial distinctions that do not comport with tort principles, public
expectations, and principles of governmental immunity.
Because the legislature has addressed the immunity issue affirma
tively by enacting the MTCA, it is more difficult than at common law
for the court to alter the structure of governmental immunity. Action
by the court in this area now is subject to the restraint of the separa
tion of powers doctrine. 146 In light of this parameter, there appear to
be three alternatives to bring the present governmental immunity
scheme with respect to physicians into conformity with sound public
policy.
The first alternative involves the basic interpretation of "public
employee" as used in the MTCA. The statutory definition of "public
employee" is nonfunctional without reliance on other MTCA provi
sions and common law principles. 147 Because of the Act's ambiguous
language, the court, as interpreter of legislation, 148 could adopt a new,
purposive interpretation of the term. While declaring the impractica
bility and unreasonableness of the current determinative categoriza
tions under the direction and control definition, the court could assert
145. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
146. The legislature is given the power to create laws under MASS. CONST. part 2,
ch. I, § I art. IV. The separation of judicial from legislative power is established in MASS.
CONST. part I, art. XXX.
147. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note II and accompanying text.
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that the purposes of the legislation and the intent of the drafters, could
best be served by the exclusion of "gray area" physicians from the
MTCA's grant of immunity. 149 Such an interpretation of the MTCA
would avoid the disturbing result of immunity based on capricious dis
tinctions in employment relationships, which clearly was a goal of im
munity reform as articulated in Whitney.15o As previously noted, this
interpretation satisfies public policy in terms of conformity with tort
principles, citizens' expectations, and government interests.
This alternative may pose problems, however, with some who
would argue that the ambiguity in the definition of "public employee"
is not so great as to warrant a definition which excludes all "gray
area" physicians from immunity under the MTCA. Assuming that
physicians who perform services exclusively for the government would
be considered "public employees" under the MTCA, it could be ar
gued that the qualification in the definition of "public employee"
which includes persons serving in a "part-time" capacity l51 would en
compass "gray area" physicians because they dedicate part of their
practice to public service. Thus, the ambiguity of the statutory lan
guage is not so severe as to exclude all "gray area" physicians from the
protection of the MTCA.
The tenuity of the first alternative highlights the desirability of a
second alternative for resolution of the difficulty posed by the current
interpretation. That is, the legislature could amend the MTCA ex
pressly to exclude from coverage, all physicians except those who per
form services exclusively for the government. Although this is not a
likely solution politically because it probably would be opposed by
medical organizations, who traditionally have exercised strong lobby
ing power,152 such a remedy would be preferable because it eliminates
any separation of powers implications.
149. There is widespread support for this method of construction. Glasser v. Direc
tor of Div. of Employment Sec., 393 Mass. 574, 577,471 N.E.2d 1338, 1340 (1984) ("Our
task is to interpret the statute according to the intent of the Legislature ... considering the
purposes and remedies intended to be advanced."); Walsh v. Ogorzalek, 372 Mass. 271,
274,361 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (1977) (purpose of statute controls its construction); W. TWIN
ING & D. MIERS, How TO DO THINGS WITH RULES 113 (1976) ("[Ilt is also a widely held
view, which we share, that careful examination of the purpose(s) of a rule is one of the most
important aids to resolving doubts in interpretation."); S. EDGAR, CRAIES ON STATUTE
LAW 96-98 (7th ed. 1971) (interpret acts in light of law prior to enactment and purpose for
changing previous law and discard unreasonable result in favor of "reasonably practical
result"); E. BEAL, CARDINAL RULES OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 275-78 (2d ed. 1908).
ISO. Whitney, 373 Mass. at 215, 366 N.E.2d at 1214-15.
lSI. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258, § I (1986).
152. See generally L. SABATO, PAC POWER: INSIDE THE WORLD OF POLITICAL
ACTION COMMIlTEES (1984).
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The third alternative to modify the current scheme of governmen
tal immunity with respect to physicians in Massachusetts involves an
interpretation of section lO(b) of the MTCA. Section lO(b) provides
that the MTCA "shall not apply to ... any claim based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre
tionary function or duty ...."153
The basis of this argument for an alternative interpretation is the
definition of "discretionary function or duty." In Irwin v. Town of
Ware,154 the court stated that "discretionary functions" were "those
'characterized by the high degree of discretion and judgment involved
in weighing alternatives and making choices with respect to public
policy and planning.' "155 In light of this language, it is possible to
interpret the discretionary clause of section lO(b) of the MTCA to in
clude patient care by physicians.
The definition of a discretionary function provided in Irwin is sat
isfied largely when considering the activity of a physician in adminis
tering health care services. A physician's activities often include a
"high degree of discretion and judgment in weighing alternatives."156
In many cases the physician, with the informed consent of the patient,
will have to choose among alternative courses of treatment depending
on a multitude of factors, including the patient's present condition,
prognosis, proven effectiveness of alternatives, and sometimes the
availability of financial resources. 157 However, part of the Irwin defi
nition needs to be modified to account for the particular nature of a
physician's services. Although the court stated that there must be dis
cretion and judgment in decisions with respect to public policy and
planning, the usual interpretation of policy and planning is unsatisfac
153. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258, § 1O(b) (1986).
154. 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984). In Irwin, the plaintiffs instituted a
negligence action against the Town of Ware after a police officer failed to take an intoxi
cated driver into protective custody and that driver later struck and injured the plaintiffs.
Id. at 746-47, 467 N.E.2d at 1295.
155. Id. at 753, 467 N.E.2d at 1298 (quoting Whitney v. City of Worcester, 373
Mass. 208, 218, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1216 (1977)).
156. Id.
157. See generally S. KNOEBEL, PERSPECTIVES ON CLINICAL DECISION MAKING
(\986); J. BALLA, THE DIAGNOSTIC PROCESS: A MODEL FOR CLINICAL TEACHERS
(1985).
Medical decisions often are made on inconclusive evidence and are influenced by non
medical considerations. See J. STEIN, MAKING MEDICAL CHOICES: WHO IS RESPONSI
BLE? 83-99 (1978).
For a discussion of the factors in health care decision making from the patient's per
spective, see w. WINSLADE & J. Ross, CHOOSING LIFE OR DEATH: A GUIDE FOR PA
TIENTS, FAMILIES AND PROFESSIONALS 255-56 (1986).
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tory in the realm of physician services. 158 In the circumstances of a
physician's activities, there is not an analogous public policy or plan to
follow, as there was in Irwin where the legislature implemented a plan
to remove intoxicated drivers from the road. 159 Rather, medical care
by a physician is guided by policy and planning considerations that are
specific to each patient's needs. 160 Therefore, a physician providing
158. In Irwin, the court determined that the police officer's decision not to take the
intoxicated driver into custody was not discretionary because the legislature had already
made a policy judgment to remove those drivers from the roads. Irwin, 392 Mass. at 753,
467 N.E.2d at 1299. See also Doherty v. Town of Belmont, 396 Mass. 271,485 N.E.2d 183
(1985) (maintenance of town parking lot not discretionary).
159. Although the supreme judicial court in Kelley explicitly rejected the proposi
tion that Dr. Rossi was "engaged in a discretionary function," 395 Mass. 659, 665 n.6, 481
N.E.2d 1340, 1344 n.6 (1985), the court's reasoning is tenuous and the discussion should,
therefore, be distinguished. The court stated that "[t]he doctor was governed by the stan
dard of accepted medical practice," and thus, the activity was not discretionary. Id. This
reasoning may oversimplify a complex issue.
In situations involving relatively clear diagnoses and proven courses of treatment, the
court's analysis holds true. However, accepted medical practice does not provide direction
for physicians in choosing among alternative courses of treatment where the diagnosis is
complicated and the treatments are more untested. See L. ISRAEL, DECISION-MAKING:
THE MODERN DOCTOR'S DILEMMA 39-59 (1982) (medical decision making and uncer
tainty in the treatment of cancer); H. BURSZTAJN, R. HAMM, R. FEINBLOOM & A. BROD
SKY, MEDICAL CHOICES, MEDICAL CHANCES: How PATIENTS, FAMILIES AND
PHYSICIANS CAN COPE WITH UNCERTAINTY 54-84 (1981) (general discussion of uncer
tainty in medicine because it is a new science). It is arguable that these decisions are the
ones that involve a high degree of discretion and judgment for which the Whitney court
sought to avoid governmental liability because there is no ascertainable standard. Cf
Whitney, 373 Mass. 208, 218, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1216 (1977) (government should be liable
where the alleged tortious conduct involves "the carrying out of previously established
policies or plans"). See also Pina v. Commonwealth, 400 Mass. 408, 415 (1987) (quoting
Bartel v. FAA, 617 F. Supp. 190,196 n.29 (D.D.C. 1985) (citing Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15 (1953») (Discretionary functions are those "based on an individual, case-by
case analysis and in which [the decision maker's] decision includes elements of judgment
and discretion. ").
As far as accepted medical standards as established by state examining boards are
concerned, Professor Southwick has claimed:
State medical licensing laws certainly do not constitute a satisfactory vehicle for
establishing and controlling professional standards .... Licensing furnishes no
continuing control over an individual's professional competence; the statutes in
no way recognize the demands placed upon the doctor by the ever-increasing
specialization of medicine; accordingly, they do not adequately protect the public
from incompetence .... The present licensing statutes for physicians, nurses, and
other professional personnel also impede rather than facilitate improvements in
the quality of health care by failing to clarify scope-of-practice problems.
A. SOUTHWICK, supra note 65, at 430 (footnote omitted).
160. The only underlying policy considerations are prevention of negligent treatment
and, moreover, provision of high quality care through enforcement of regulations promul
gated by the Board of Registration in Medicine. But again, policies established by the
Board cannot specifically address all medical conditions and treatments and, thus, cannot
eliminate the discretion in physician care. Indeed, the discretionary decisions made by a
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medical care should be considered to be engaged in a "discretionary
function," thereby precluding application of the MTCA, and, thus,
governmental liability.
However, this rationale for preclusion of governmental liability is
problematic in two respects. First, if the MTCA is inapplicable, and
thus the government is not liable, the question of whether the physi
cian will be personally liable under a common law cause of action still
remains. Specifically, if section 1O(b) precludes recovery from the gov
ernment, can the patient bring a common law negligence action
against the physician personally?·
If the patient could bring such an action, in most cases it would
be unsuccessful because at common law a public officer is not liable for
the negligent performance of a discretionary act. 161 However, there
may be liability for negligence if the activity could be classified as
commercial. 162
It could also be contended that the enactment of the MTCA was
designed to eliminate the distinctions between public officers and mu
nicipal agents, as well as those between public and commercial func
tions, and as a pervasive statutory scheme it displaces completely the
common law system of liability. 163 Thus, the physician could not be
held personally liable if the government was not liable under section
1O(b).

The second problem with this interpretation is that its implica
tions exceed the thesis of this article. Specifically, if a physician's ac
tivity is discretionary, it is discretionary for "gray area" physicians
and physicians employed exclusively by the government. Therefore,
this interpretation would preclude application of MTCA immunity for
all physicians-a position not necessarily supported by this article.
Of the three alternatives which could be used to modify the cur
rent application of the MTCA to exclude "gray area" physicians, an
amendment to the Act by the legislature would be most effective. This
method would eliminate any separation of powers concerns and diffi
culties in interpretation. However, absent action by the legislature,
the court would be within its province in interpreting the ambiguous
physician, with the consent of the patient or patient's family, can be profound-sometimes
involving life and death.
161. Whitney, 373 Mass. at 220,366 N.E.2d at 1217 (citing Gildea v. Ellershaw, 363
Mass. 800, 820, 298 N.E.2d 847, 858-59 (1973».
162. See Fulgoni v. Johnston, 302 Mass. 421, 423, 19 N.E.2d 542, 543 (1939).
163. See S. EDGAR, supra note 149, at 339 (it must be unmistakably clear that the
legislature intended to abrogate entire common law scheme).
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statutory language to modify the current interpretation of the MTCA
to exclude immunity for "gray area" physicians.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In response to the inequities that resulted from absolute govern
mental immunity under the common law, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Whitney v. City of Worcester 164 mandated that the
legislature develop a new immunity scheme. Beginning with the prem
ise that "governmental entities should be liable for tortious acts in the
same manner as private individuals,"165 the court proposed three rudi
ments which the legislature was to consider: 1) accepted tort princi
ples, 2) public expectations with respect to the government, and
3) limitation on governmental liability.
In defining the bounds of the legislative respo.nse, the Massachu
setts Tort Claims Act, the courts have had to interpret the meaning of
"public employee," because only those persons are granted immunity
under the Act. The courts' interpretations have been based on a direc
tbn and control test which focuses on nebulous distinctions in the na
ture of the employment relationspip. With respect to physicians, this
direction and control test is not consistent with the guidelines es
poused by the supreme judicial court. The direction and control test
disregards the realities of modern health care delivery systems and
fails to take into account the unique characteristics of physicians, as
compared to many other government employees. Under this system,
many physicians who are employed both privately and by the govern
ment and who negligently injure their patients fall within the Act's
shield of immunity, and the policies underlying the immunity scheme
are frustrated.
A more appropriate and effective system of immunity would ex
clude all "gray area" physicians from immunity. As discussed
throughout this article, such a scheme better addresses the concern of
the supreme judicial court in striking an appropriate balance "between
the public interest in fairness to injured persons and in promoting ef
fective government."166

164.
165.
166.

373 Mass. 208, 366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977).
Whitney, 373 Mass. at 216, 366 N.E.2d at 1215.
Id.

